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The clash between Chief Justice Roberts'
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is
best seen as a clash between two visions of
judicial restraint, and two eras of the
conservative legal movement.
At the sprightly age of 57 and less than
seven years into his term as chief justice,
John Roberts looks like a man whom time
has left behind. The reaction among legal
conservatives to the Roberts opinion in
National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelins (the healthcare case)
has been brutal. Many have accused the
chief justice of exchanging the black robes
of the jurist for the trappings of the
politician. The chief justice is said to have
"blinked" and "failed [his] most basic
responsibility." Noted originalist scholar
Mike Rappaport strongly implied that
Roberts is "both a knave and a fool." The
cataloguing could go on.
As much as these reactions reveal about
differing views on a hotly contested question
of constitutional law, they are at least as
interesting because of what they say about
the state of the conservative legal
movement. Today's legal conservatives
view the chief justice's opinion as judicial
abdication, but it was not too long ago that
the philosophy reflected in Roberts' opinion
would have been conservative orthodoxy.
The truth is that the conservative legal
movement's conception of judicial restraint
has changed, departing from the view it held
when it emerged from the constitutional
wilderness to which it had been banished
during the Warren Court. NFIB i. Sebelins
displays a conservative legal movement in
transition-and one that is increasingly
leaving the judicial restraint in Roberts'
opinion behind.
Roberts lays down a theory of judicial
restraint early in his opinion. Quoting his
nineteenth-century brethren, the chief justice
states: 'Proper respect for a co-ordinate
branch of the government' requires that we
strike down an Act of Congress only if 'the
lack of constitutional authority to pass [the]
act in question is clearly demonstrated."'
Justice John Marshall Harlan eloquently
voiced this view of judicial restraint in his
dissent in Lochner v. New York (1905).
Harlan argued that a statute must be "plainly
and palpably unauthorized by law" to be
held unconstitutional. One of the
Progressive Movement's titanic figures-
Felix Frankfurter-would adopt this as his
mantra and carry it onto the Supreme Court.
There he would watch his fellow New Deal
justices turn against the principle preached
by anti-Lochner jurists for a generation. By
the time Frankfurter retired in 1962, the
Warren Court's revolution in constitutional
law was well under way.
It was precisely this revolution that inspired
a counterrevolution: the conservative legal
movement. Robert Bork's 1971 Indiana Law
Journal article calling for a jurisprudence of
''neutral principles" and a return to the
intentions of the Founders raised the banner
around which modern originalism was
formed. The standard was taken up a few
years later by then-Justice Rehnquist in his
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lecture "The Notion of a Living
Constitution," and soon the prolific Raoul
Berger had entered the fray with his book
Government by Judiciary. The movement
achieved major success with dizzying speed
when Ronald Reagan was elected president
and his attorney general, Edwin Meese,
oversaw fundamental change in the federal
judiciary.
Of course, originalism was not-and is
not-the entirety of the conservative legal
movement. There has always been a vocal
libertarian element, especially with the rise
of the law and economics movement.
Similarly, there has been a strain of legal
conservatism that rejects originalism on the
one hand and libertarian ideology on the
other. But when it comes to constitutional
interpretation, originalism has been the
default theory of legal conservatism, and it
is appropriate to look at how originalism
developed for insight into the broader
movement.
As Princeton professor Keith Whittington
has explained, the conservative legal
movement of the early years was "reactive"
and "motivated by substantive disagreement
with the recent and then-current actions of
the Warren and Burger courts." As such,
"the primary commitment within this critical
posture was to judicial restraint."
This was the restraint of Harlan's Lochner
dissent resurrected, with its emphasis on
deference to legislative majorities. Bork
made the connection between the Warren
Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut
and the Lochner Court's infamous opinion
quite explicit, as did Rehnquist. The call for
a judiciary that was deferential to legislative
enactments was a theme of this period.
All that soon began to change. Scholars
began to place less emphasis on the judicial
restraint of Bork and Rehnquist. It was not
so much that judicial restraint lost pride-of-
place in originalist theory as much as the
conception of restraint transformed.
Whittington captured this new way of
thinking about restraint in his book
Constitutional Interpretation: "An originalist
Court may well find itself quite active in
striking down legislation at odds with the
clear requirements of the inherited text.
Originalism requires deference only to the
Constitution and to the limits of human
knowledge, not to contemporary
politicians."
From this perspective, judicial restraint
entails adherence to the original meaning: no
more but also no less. Stare decisis might
have a role to play, depending on one's
theory of originalism, but generally if the
originalist judge thinks a statute is
unconstitutional, he has an obligation to
strike it down. A judge that adopts the
attitude of Justice Harlan-waiting until a
law is "plainly and palpably"
unconstitutional-is too likely to
subordinate the Constitution to the errant
judgment of today's self-interested
legislators.
That is not to say that this new view of
judicial restraint amounted to judicial
''activism" or disregarded the respect due to
the political branches. The difference was
one of emphasis: how far should a judge go
to uphold a statute at the risk of deforming
the Constitution? The new view thought
Justice Harlan went too far. The old judicial
restraint was dismissed, in the words of
Whittington, as "judicial passivism."
Judicial restraint used to mean that a judge
should bend over backwards to avoid
striking down a law, and this view was once
widely held within the conservative legal
community. But this idea has long since
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faded from the scene, and judicial restraint is
less likely to be thought of by today's legal
conservatives as coinciding with judicial
nonintervention. How many statutes the
Court strikes down is simply beside the
point for today's legal conservative; the
question is why the Court struck down the
statutes that it did.
And so we arrive at NFIB v. Sebelius. The
chief justice's opinion displays a clear
embrace of the old judicial restraint. He
announces that "every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to
save a statute from unconstitutionality."
Although the joint dissenters would likely
agree with this principle, the key word is
"reasonable." The Justice Harlan conception
of judicial restraint leads Roberts to stretch
the language of the statute far beyond what
the dissenters believe is reasonable-or
indeed constitutional.
Roberts first analyzes the individual
mandate under the commerce and necessary
and proper clauses of the Constitution and
concludes that it cannot be upheld on those
grounds. Writing for the Court, the chief
justice invokes the canon of constitutional
avoidance quoted above, requiring the
justices to adopt "every reasonable
construction" to avoid striking down the
statute. Roberts proceeds to hold that the
health care law does not impose a legal
mandate to purchase health insurance.
Rather, he reinterprets the statute as levying
a tax on those who fail to acquire insurance,
which he holds was a constitutional exercise
of Congress's taxation power.
The chief justice's opinion is full of
acknowledgments that his interpretation is a
creative one. He sets the bar low for
constitutionality by saying that "the question
is not whether that is the most natural
interpretation of the mandate, but only
whether it is a 'fairly possible' one." He
concedes that "the statute reads more
naturally as a command to buy insurance
than as a tax," that it "states that individuals
.shall' maintain health insurance," and that
"the most straightforward reading of the
mandate is that it commands individuals to
purchase insurance." Yet, despite these
interpretive data-and a good deal more, as
the dissenters point out-the chief justice
concludes that the insurance requirement
can be justified as a tax.
The reason Roberts does so is that his view
of judicial restraint in NFIB v. Sebelius
requires him to go to the limits of
plausibility to save the statute. The
dissenters, who express a different view of
restraint, refuse to go that far.
The old conception of judicial restraint is
evident in the chief justice's theme that the
Court is a legal-rather than political-
body. At the beginning of his opinion, he is
at pains to state: "We do not consider
whether the Act embodies sound policies.
That judgment is entrusted to the Nation's
elected leaders. We ask only whether
Congress has the power under the
Constitution to enact the challenged
provisions." Then, at the conclusion, almost
identical language: "But the Court does not
express any opinion on the wisdom of the
Affordable Care Act. Under the
Constitution, that judgment is reserved to
the people." Like the legal conservatives of
the 1970s, the Roberts opinion emphasizes
the modesty of the judicial role and the
importance of deferring to legislative
majorities.
Just as the old theory of judicial restraint
came under intellectual attack, so too does
Roberts' opinion for the Court-and for the
same reasons. The problem with the old
theory of judicial restraint, so the critique
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goes, is that in straining to sustain the will of
today's fleeting majority, a judge may
ignore a fairly clear constitutional command
from the original popular sovereign: the
people who enacted the Constitution. The
more recent idea of restraint sees the old
way as a straightforward abdication of a
judge's duty to safeguard the limits of
political power. Where a law is
unconstitutional, it must be declared so, and
the judge who contorts a law to save it is
viewed as engaging in the very activism he
disclaims.
This contemporary view of judicial restraint
is on full display in the joint dissent. The
four justices lambast the Roberts opinion:
"The Court regards its strained statutory
interpretation as judicial modesty. It is not.
It amounts instead to a vast judicial
overreaching." In a fascinating peroration,
the dissenters appeal to the same values
underlying the old version of judicial
restraint, but they see it better expressed in
their own willingness to jettison the
healthcare law entirely:
The values that should have determined our
course today are caution, minimalism, and
the understanding that the Federal
Government is one of limited powers. But
the Court's ruling undermines those values
at every turn. In the name of restraint, it
overreaches. In the name of constitutional
avoidance, it creates new constitutional
questions. In the name of cooperative
federalism, it undermines state sovereignty.
The clash between the chief justice's
opinion and that of the joint dissenters is
therefore best seen as a clash between two
visions of judicial restraint, and two eras of
the conservative legal movement.
Of course, Roberts and the joint dissenters
have nuanced views on judicial restraint,
and NFIB v. Sebelins does not define those
views. Justice Scalia has long advocated
judicial modesty and deference to legislative
majorities, as seen in his dissent in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey (1992), and the chief
justice joined the Court's opinion in Citizens
United v. FEC (2010) in the face of heated
political opposition. The point here is simply
to identify the tensions within the
conservative legal movement evident in the
NFIB opinions.
The overwhelmingly negative response to
the chief justice's analysis shows just how
far the movement has distanced itself from
the old theory of restraint, embracing instead
a view that cares less about how many
statutes are struck down than about why
they are invalidated. For the chief justice,
his opinion is the epitome of judicial
modesty. For the dissenters, it is the height
of judicial arrogance. Roberts thinks his
actions are compelled by respect for the
coordinate branches of government; the
dissenters see his actions as flouting the
Constitution that called that government into
being. And at this moment in the history of
the conservative legal movement, Roberts
stood alone.
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